The Making of Competition Policy
Opis
"Confronting America's historic reconstruction during the Great Depression and World War II, antitrust innovator Thurman Arnold declared that antitrust, as 'a symbol of our traditional ideals' made change 'less painful.' Daniel Crane's and Herbert Hovenkamp's collection of economic theories and commentary demonstrates that competition policy was as old as the nation and as current as global financial collapse. From Adam Smith, through economic ideas underlying the 1890 Sherman Act, down to the contest between Chicago and post-Chicago theories, competition policy influenced American opportunity. Anyone interested in Americans' persistent search for economic innovation and justice will benefit from this illuminating collection."--Tony A. Freyer, University Research Professor of History and Law, The University of Alabama
"In this collection, Daniel Crane and Herbert Hovenkamp provide scholars, students, and practitioners with an invaluable introduction to the primary texts of the American antitrust tradition and its progenitors, combining judicious and accessible selections from the texts of each era with perceptive and informed explanatory context. Presenting this succession of ideas of economists, lawyers, and politicians over two centuries sheds light not only on the history of antitrust economics and ideologies, but also on the persistent influences that shape modern antitrust law and policy."-- William H. Page, Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law
"All students of economic history and competition policy should read this thorough intellectual history of competition in the United States. From the classical theories, to the progressive era through the New Deal, to the post-Chicago movement, this new book is a tour de force that presents the intellectual history of competition policy better than any previous publication. They balance the rich historical perspectives, intellectual insights, and economic and poliACKNOWLEDGMENTS ; INTRODUCTION ; CHAPTER 1. CLASSICAL THEORIES ; ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ; DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION ; JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ; CHAPTER 2. FEDERALISM, ANTIFEDERALISM, AND JACKSONIANISM ; MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ; AGRIPPA, TO THE PEOPLE ; ALEXANDER HAMILTON, CONTINTENTALIST ; THOMAS COOLEY, LIMITS TO STATE CONTROL OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ; CHAPTER 3. CLASSICISM, NEOCLASSICISM, AND THE SHERMAN ACT ; ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS ; ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC WELFARE ; HENRY RAND HATFIELD, THE CHICAGO TRUST CONFERENCE (OF 1899) ; CHAPTER 4. PROGRESSIVISM AND THE 1912 ELECTION ; THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE TRUSTS, THE PEOPLE, AND THE SQUARE DEAL ; WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, WE MUST GET BACK TO COMPETITION ; WOODROW WILSON, THE TARIFF AND THE TRUSTS ; CHAPTER 5. IMPERFECT, MONOPOLISTIC, AND WORKABLE COMPETITION ; EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION ; JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION ; JOHN MAURICE CLARK, TOWARD A CONCEPT OF WORKABLE COMPETITION ; CHAPTER 6. THE NEW DEAL AND THE INSTITUTIONALISTS ; ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY ; LOUIS BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS ; REXFORD TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL ARTS ; THURMAN ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS ; CHAPTER 7. ANTITRUST AFTER POPULISM ; RICHARD HOFSTADTER, WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ANTITRUST MOVEMENT? ; CHAPTER 8. ORDOLIBERALISM AND THE FREIBURG SCHOOL ; FRANZ BOHM, WALTER EUCKEN & HANS GROSSMANN-DOERTH, THE ORDO MANIFESTO OF 1936 ; FRANZ BOHM, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER ; CHAPTER 9. COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ; JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY ; KENNETH ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTION ; CHAPTER 10. STRUCTURALISM ; JOE BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ; CARL KAYSEN AND DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS ; THE NEAL REPORT (1967) ; CHAPTER 11. THE CHICAGO SCHOOL ; GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY ; AARON DIRECTOR AND EDWARD LEVI, LAW THE FUTURE: TRADE REGULATION ; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX ; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ; CHAPTER 12. TRANSACTIONS COSTS ECONOMICS AND THE POST-CHICAGO MOVEMENT ; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS ; F.M. SCHERER, CONSERVATIVE ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST: A VARIETY OF INFLUENCES ; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
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