Game Theory

Game theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games. 'This book fills a long-standing need for a first-rate textbook for an undergraduate course in game theory. It strikes an almost ideal balance between accessibility and rigor with a series of well-chosen examples to light the way. The standard examples (Cournot, Bertrand, location choice) are here along with a host of less common ones (currency speculation, the Six Day War, the Cuban Missile Crisis). Anyone teaching an undergraduate game theory course should consider adopting Heifetz's book as a text.' Bart Lipman, Boston University 'Game Theory: Interactive Strategies in Economics and Management is an introduction to game theory written by Aviad Heifetz, a leading scholar of the foundations of game theory. The book uses well chosen and up-to-date examples, ranging from conflict in the Middle East to the Internet, to introduce the key ideas from game theory in an elementary but rigorous way. As well as covering classical material, the book reaches topics at the frontiers of the subject; I particularly enjoyed the material on strategic uncertainty, global games and difficulties of backwards induction. I would recommend the use of this book as a text for introducing students to game theory and giving a conceptually broad but non-technical introduction to game theory and its applications across the social sciences.' Stephen E. Morris, Princeton University 'This is an outstanding introductory book for individuals who want to acquire basic understanding of current non-cooperative game theory. In addition to the standard material, the discussion includes more advanced topics, e.g., rationalizability, learning dynamics and evolution; observations from behavioral game theory and experiments; and excellent examples from business and economics. Without excessive mathematics and symbolism, the book can be taught to individuals capable of rigorous analytical thinking, for example interested undergraduates and MBAs.' Ehud Kalai, James J. O'Connor Professor of Decision and Game Sciences, Northwestern UniversityPart I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.