Ad Infinitum

Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old, about its account of justification, reasoning, epistemic responsibility, disagreement, and trust, among other important issues. The volume clarifies the relationship between infinitism and other epistemological views, such as skepticism, coherentism, foundationalism and contextualism, and it offers novel perspectives on the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of regresses and reasons.Introduction ; 1. Knowing Better, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Infinitism ; 2. Klein and the Regress Argument ; 3. Reasons Require Reasons ; 4. Infinitism ; 5. Virtue and Vice Among the Infinite ; 6. Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism ; 7. Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing ; 8. Klein's Case for Infinitism ; 9. Can an Infinite Regress Justify Everything? ; 10. Can Perception Halt the Regress of Justifications? ; 11. Infinitism ; 12. Creative Reasoning ; 13. Avoiding the Regress ; 14. First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem