Rulemaking by the European Commission

The last few years have seen major reforms to the delegation of powers and post-delegation supervision of the European Commission. In light of these reforms, Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers assesses whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, and if so, how? Specific questions answered include: have the objectives of the reform been achieved and what were these objectives? How does the new system affect the division of functions between the institutions of the EU and the institutional balance? Has this new system affected the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and if so, how does it concern its citizens? Presented by an interdisciplinary group of experts who have actively followed or participated in the process of reform, the book is structured in four parts: (1) the political and historical context in which the rule-making takes place, (2) the operation and functioning of the system before and after the reform, (3) the legal substance of a new framework for rule-making and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU, and (4) the procedural dimension, including the legal preconditions for non-institutional actors to participate.1. Introduction ; 2. The Evolution of the Approach to Executive Rule-making in the EU ; 3. The Reform of Comitology and Delegated Acts: from an Executive's View ; 4. Delegation of Powers and Parliament: Political Problems, Legal Solution? ; 5. Interinstitutional Tensions in the New System for Delegation of Powers ; 6. The Contest for Power in Delegated Rule-making ; 7. The Reserved domain of the Legislature: The Notion of 'Essential Elements of an Area' ; 8. Is there a Hierarchy of Legislative, Delegates, and Implementing Acts? ; 9. Comitology, Rule-making, and the Lisbon Settlement: Tensions and Strains ; 10. Judicial Protection for Private Parties in European Commission Rule-Making ; 11. The Making of Delegates and Implementing Acts: Legitimacy Beyond Institutional Balance ; 12. Conclusion